Pakistan’s Strongest Weapon on the Afghan Front Is Law

Pakistan’s Strongest Weapon on the Afghan Front Is Law

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Pakistan’s legal basis against Kabul is real but narrow: Afghanistan has a duty not to let its territory shelter terrorists, and Pakistan may use proportionate force in self-defence. Yet the defence minister’s declaration of open war earlier this year went further than that, and Iran above all has been asking where the war ends. Force without limits is not self-defence. It is simply war. If Pakistan wants partners to accept its grievance, can it afford to ignore the very law that makes the grievance valid?

At the Moscow Format last month, Islamabad’s envoy said more than 4,700 Pakistanis have died in three years from terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. International law does not ask a state to absorb that. Since Corfu Channel, every state has a duty not to knowingly allow its territory to be used to harm others, and Security Council Resolution 1373 requires states to deny safe haven to terrorists. The Taliban answer demands for action against the TTP with “dialogue”, which falls short. Non-recognition by most states does not weaken that duty.

A breach by Kabul does not license every response. Article 51 permits force in self-defence against an armed attack, and the International Court of Justice has been strict: in Nicaragua and DRC v. Uganda it demanded a real link between state and armed groups. Pakistan’s “unwilling or unable” argument is influential but contested, and force must also be necessary and proportionate. Strikes on border posts and TTP camps are defensible. Strikes in Kabul, where the Taliban say a rehabilitation centre was hit in March, are harder to defend.

Now consider the Taliban’s demands. Kabul wants the strikes stopped and disputes settled by diplomacy, and it insists it will set its own domestic and foreign policy without outside pressure. It also demanded that Pakistan hand over or expel alleged ISIS members. Some of this is legitimate. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter protects Afghan territorial integrity, and Pakistan’s demand for formal written commitments, which the Taliban refused to give, is the right instinct, because binding undertakings are verifiable and rhetoric is not.

The Taliban’s weakest position is the Durand Line. Their spokesman says Pakistan urged recognition of the line as the border and the Taliban refused, calling it a historical dispute. Boundaries established by treaty survive changes of government, as Article 11 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties says, and Article 62(2)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties bars invoking “fundamental change of circumstances” to escape a boundary. Uti possidetis backs this up. Pakistan should keep this separate from the terrorism dispute.

Tehran has tried to mediate, offering to facilitate dialogue when open war was declared and later pushing for a regional meeting after Turkish and Qatari efforts failed. Yet it is also hedging. Afghan officials reported Afghanistan’s trade with Iran reaching $1.6 billion in six months, ahead of its $1.1 billion with Pakistan, as Kabul shifted freight toward Chabahar. Iran is courting both neighbours, and its loyalty goes to whichever offers the more predictable partnership. A Pakistan seen as acting outside the law is a less predictable partner.

Pakistan and Iran have already shown how this can work. In early 2024 Iran struck targets inside Pakistan, and Islamabad answered with strikes of its own. Both governments then stepped back and returned to diplomacy. That episode is a template for Kabul. Neither claimed an unlimited right to force, and both reached for diplomacy once they had made their point. Iran will judge Islamabad by whether it shows the same restraint toward Afghanistan. Restraint, after all, is what gives a state’s legal claims their weight.

Pakistan’s wider credibility is at stake too. Its standing as a go-between in the US–Iran war rests on the Charter principle that force must meet strict legal tests. Islamabad cannot press that argument in Tehran’s favour while claiming a broad, unreviewable right of self-defence in Kabul. The inconsistency would be noticed in Tehran, Riyadh and Beijing, and also in Moscow. Russia recognised the Taliban government in 2025 and, at the Moscow Format, praised its rule and blocked a joint statement that tied Afghanistan to terrorism.

Pakistan’s best course is to put its security claims on firmer legal ground. It should report its Article 51 measures to the Security Council, as the Charter requires, and limit its strikes to the TTP’s operational infrastructure. It should seek a written, verifiable agreement on militant sanctuaries, with Iran, China or Qatar as guarantors. It should respect non-refoulement in its treatment of Afghan refugees, and treat the Durand Line as closed to negotiation. That posture lets Pakistan push back on Kabul’s evasions while keeping the sympathy of regional states.

So where does the war end? It ends where the law says Pakistan’s right to defend itself ends: at necessity, proportionality and a verifiable settlement. Pakistan’s grievance is justified, and the law gives it the means to press its case. If it chooses its tools carefully, it can restore security on its western border without damaging the alliances that its long-term security depends on. The choice is not between strength and legality. Legality, properly used, is the stronger weapon here.

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