The recent adoption of Pakistan’s 26th Constitutional Amendment signifies a turning point in the country’s judiciary. Among its many innovations, the amendment’s establishing of Constitutional Benches in the Supreme and High Courts has led to heated discussion regarding Pakistan’s judiciary’s future role and autonomy. While new benches are meant to streamline judicial proceedings and increase the judiciary’s focus on crucial constitutional issues, there are legitimate concerns about how they will work in practice and whether such a reform was required or beneficial.

At their basis, the Constitutional Benches are viewed as a tool for centralizing constitutional authority and providing specialized resources to high-stakes cases involving federal concerns, basic rights, and key legal challenges. The idea is easy to understand by focusing expertise on specific benches, the court aims to ensure that important constitutional issues are treated with greater emphasis and consistency. With a system that requires at least five justices to deliberate on such matters, the aim is that these benches will provide a consistent, stable approach to constitutional interpretation. Proponents say that this will result in more uniform decisions and lower chances of conflicting rulings within the judiciary.

However, while the objective may appear logical, the establishment of Constitutional Benches raises fundamental concerns about judicial independence. The appointment method for judges, including the Chief Justice of Pakistan, has been transferred to a Special Parliamentary Committee (SPC) made up of National Assembly and Senate members. This group will select the Chief Justice from among the three most senior justices, with no specific criteria or openness in its processes. As a result, there are concerns that judicial selections would be influenced by politics, with the ruling majority potentially playing a large role in appointing judges to these Constitutional benches. Such influence could change the judiciary’s focus towards the present government’s objectives rather than maintaining an unbiased posture, weakening the separation of powers and eroding public trust in the courts.

Furthermore, while the establishment of Constitutional Benches is effective in theory, it can unintentionally restrict the court’s autonomy in cases involving pressing public concerns. Suo Motu authority has historically been used by Pakistan’s judiciary to take action on matters of public interest without requiring the filing of a formal lawsuit. Holding the legislative and executive branches responsible has been made possible in large part by this authority. The modification, however, limits the judiciary’s Suo Motu authority, so decreasing its proactive supervision and changing its function to one that is more reactive, primarily addressing instances that are brought forth by outside parties. Critics contend that the judiciary’s ability to function as a check on governmental overreach may be diminished as a result of this limited authority, which may cause delays in responding to concerns affecting basic rights.

It’s also important to consider whether constitutional benches can accomplish their goals without sacrificing judicial independence. Proponents argue that the judiciary will be better equipped to handle constitutional cases with a more centralized organization. However, protections against political interference are not guaranteed under the current system. Instead of acting as an impartial defender of justice, the public may believe that the judiciary is becoming more and more in line with political objectives if there are no clear safeguards in place to guarantee an impartial appointment of judges for these benches. This is particularly concerning for a nation that depends on judicial independence to uphold the rule of law and democratic ideals.

Pakistan’s modified judicial system has drawn criticism from other countries. Concerns have been raised by groups like the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), which contend that permitting political interference in legal proceedings could jeopardize judicial independence. The need for an unbiased judiciary free from political pressure has also been underlined by the UN Committee on Human Rights. These cautions highlight the dangers of undermining the judiciary’s independence and are in line with generally acknowledged standards for judicial behavior.

The judiciary must operate as a fully independent institution if Pakistan’s democracy is to endure. The aim to increase efficiency may have led to the creation of Constitutional Benches, but these modifications need to be carried out with caution. Public confidence will decline and the courts’ function as an impartial arbiter of justice will be weakened if Pakistan’s judiciary is seen as becoming more political. The Constitutional Benches must function openly, with judicial nominations free from political influence, in order to maintain democratic integrity. Pakistan’s democratic government has always been based on the independence of the judiciary, which must be preserved if these reforms are intended to enhance the nation’s legal system instead of make it worse.

In conclusion, the establishment of Constitutional Benches by the 26th Amendment to the Constitution may have stemmed from a well-intentioned wish to increase the effectiveness and focus of the judiciary. It is difficult to ignore the threats it poses to public trust and judicial independence, although. The amendment might change the balance of power by giving a Special Parliamentary Committee greater power and limiting the judiciary’s proactive Suo Motu jurisdiction. This could make the judiciary less resistant to political influences that could compromise its impartiality as the law’s protector.

Judicial independence must continue to be a pillar of Pakistan’s democratic system, free from the influence of other departments. Constitutional benches could, actually, assist the judiciary in consistently addressing important constitutional concerns if they are put into place with openness, fair selection, and strong protections against political meddling depth. But without these safeguards, any change runs the risk of undermining the judiciary’s ability to enforce the rule of law and destroying public confidence in it. Maintaining Pakistan’s democratic integrity and guaranteeing the preservation of citizens’ rights depend on a judiciary that is free, open, and independent.