The shift in Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) tactics after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 has led to an upsurge in terror related incidents in Pakistan. These shifting tactics has made TTP a threat for the region once again. The aim of changing tactics is clear as the terror organization is looking to stay in the region for longer this time. However, since its inception in 2007 it has targeted security forces, civilians and government infrastructure at will. But recently the group has changed tactics and targets which highlights a change in leadership and objectives. Therefore, understanding these changes is vital for policy makers and security agencies so protection of national security and peace is ensured.

TTP has shifted its targets to small scale attacks instead of conducting attacks at larger scale without any discrimination. The goal earlier was to instill fear among masses and state authority. This was achieved through the use of suicide bombings in public areas such as schools, mosques, markets and hospitals. The attack on the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar was one such incident that registered a death toll of one hundred and forty innocent lives in a single day causing a public outrage. Now, the TTP is adopting a more selective targets such as law enforcement agencies, tribal leaders, the government and political leaders. The TTP carry these attacks through ambushes, road side bombings and targeted killings. These tactical changes are solely driven by two reasons: projecting itself as an organized insurgent group and not alienating itself from local population.

Change of rule in Afghanistan is also a factor in TTP’s recent shift in tactics. After returning of Afghan Taliban as rulers in Pakistan’s neighborhood the shift in tactics has become visible. While Afghan Taliban are denying their support to the TTP but most of the attacks are initiated from the western soil. The porous nature of border and ideological commonality between the two groups allow TTP to reorganize themselves next door. This shift in tactics has led to targeting Pakistani security forces in bordering regions of Afghanistan such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. The goal of targeting forces in these regions is to undermine state control in areas that are fragile already. This has resulted in diverting Pakistan’s security forces attentions to its western border.

TTP has employed the use of propaganda effectively this time. It has used as a tool to complement its changing tactics. As earlier propaganda was used to highlight attacks against civilians and projected the conflict as war against infidels. But now its building its image as defender of Islam against state that it believes is oppressive. The TTP uploads videos of attacks which it conducts against law enforcement agencies on various social media platforms projecting them as an act of war. Such framing of ideology supports group in recruitment of new fighters from regions that have grievances against the government. Through avoiding mass attacks on civilians, the TTP is looking to create an image that can be supported by the locals.

The TTP’s change in tactics is also showing organizations consolidation after facing multiple division internally earlier. The group has seen formation of splinter groups due to differences on style of operations and agendas. Within the group some have preferred large scale attacks and others saw controlled attacked preferable but under Noor Wali Mehsud’s command the group has seen a certain level of alignment in thought. The strategy to only attack state targets is one major factor to avoid isolation and division within.

These shift in tactics pose a threat to Pakistan’s security as number of attacks have increased over the months. Attacks on civilian centers have decreased as use of guerrilla-style tactics such as use of roadside IEDs, ambush attacks, and sniper fire through the use of US made weapons has increased. Thus, making it hard for security forces to carry out counter-terrorism operations for decisively eliminate TTP. Another challenge that makes this shift in tactics a threat is TTP’s easy access to launching pads across the border within Afghanistan. These safe heavens are used to carry out attacks within Pakistan. Despite, Islamabad highlighting this issue to the Afghan government multiple times, TTP still operates freely through these sites. As long as the TTP utilizes this freedom of movement across the border, it will keep on posing a threat.

The TTP’s shifting tactics and targets show a move from indiscriminate terror to a controlled insurgency. Through targeting security forces and limiting itself from carrying out mass-casualty civilian attacks, the group is trying to regain legitimacy, recruits, and sustain its terror activities. While this may make the group look less lethal than before, it poses a threat and internal challenge for Pakistan. For policymakers, understanding these shifts is vital in order to crafting effective responses. Counterinsurgency strategies must adapt to the group’s dynamic methods, sustaining military pressure with efforts to answer underlying grievances that support recruitment. In order for Pakistan to resolve and neutralize the threat posed by the TTP to the state and region as whole.