Afghanistan emerged as a significant U.S. foreign policy concern in 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban government that harbored and supported it. In the intervening 19 years, the United States and the Afghan Taliban have suffered numerous casualties. In that time, an elected Afghan government has replaced the Taliban.

After more than eighteen years of war in Afghanistan, the United States and the Taliban reached an agreement in what were both sides’ most intensive efforts yet to end the war. Central to the deal is a significant drawdown of U.S. troops and guarantees from the Taliban that the country will not become a safe haven for terrorists.

Doha Agreement

After months of delays, on September 12, 2020, Afghan government and Taliban representatives officially met in Doha, Qatar, to begin their first direct peace negotiations toward settlement, after more than six months of delay amid political dysfunction in Kabul and continued conflict. Since then, talks have only inched forward and fighting in many parts of Afghanistan has escalated. Negotiators spent three months reaching agreement on a mere three-page set of procedures for the talks. On February 29, 2020, after more than a year of official negotiations between U.S. and Taliban representatives, the two sides agreed to two “interconnected” guarantees: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021, and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the United States and its allies, and for talks between Kabul and the Taliban. Talks do not appear to have made progress and remained complicated by a number of factors, including high levels of violence.

Trump Administration

In July 2018, the Trump Administration entered into direct negotiations with the Taliban without the participation of Afghan government representatives. In January 2021, the Trump Administration reported that it had reduced U.S. forces in Afghanistan to 2,500, the lowest level since 2001, in advance of the potential full military withdrawal by May 2021 to which the United States committed in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement. The agreement is accompanied by text which, according to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, contains additional Taliban commitments, including to not attack U.S. or international forces. U.S. officials contend that the Taliban have not fulfilled their commitments and describe the prospective U.S. withdrawal as “conditions-based,” but have not specified exactly what conditions might halt, reverse, or otherwise alter the withdrawal timeline laid out in the agreement.

Afghan government representatives were not participants in U.S.-Taliban talks, leading some observers to conclude that the United States would prioritize a military withdrawal over a complex political settlement that preserves some of the social, political, and humanitarian gains made since 2001.

In light of the approaching withdrawal deadline and the stalling of intra-Afghan talks, the United States appears to have intensified its efforts to broker an intra-Afghan agreement. Secretary of State Antony Blinken reportedly wrote to Afghan government officials in March 2021 to express “urgency” that they form a united front and participate in planned multilateral diplomatic efforts, including talks in Turkey in April 2021. By many measures, the Taliban are in a stronger military position now than at any point since 2001. Some Members of Congress have advocated keeping U.S. troops in Afghanistan past May 2021.

Biden’s Statement

President Biden will withdraw all American troops from Afghanistan, completing the military exit by the 20th anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks that drew the United States into its longest war.

The decision, which Biden is expected to announce will keep thousands of U.S. forces in the country beyond the May 1 exit deadline that the Trump administration negotiated last year with the Taliban.

The position Biden will inherit is coloured by President Donald Trump’s order on 17 November to cut the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan from 4,500 to 2,500 by January. This reduction came after speculation that Trump might order a full military withdrawal before his term’s end, a precipitous move that almost certainly would have killed the peace process. Even the drawdown to 2,500 troops has likely shifted the balance of leverage in the talks.

President Biden, as Vice President, reportedly opposed the Obama Administration’s decision to increase U.S. force levels in 2009 and expressed skepticism about troop levels in Afghanistan. As President, he has not made extensive comments about Afghanistan, but said in a March 16, 2021, interview that the U.S.-Taliban agreement was “not a very solidly negotiated deal” and that meeting its May 1 withdrawal deadline “could happen” but would be “tough.” He also said an ongoing Administration review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan was “in process” and that reaching a decision would not take “a lot longer.” At a March 25, 2021, press conference, he said “I can’t picture” U.S. troops in Afghanistan next year. The Biden administration is expected to re-emphasise the need for a “responsible” withdrawal.

The goal is to move to “zero” troops by September, the senior administration official said. “This is not conditions-based. President Biden has judged that a conditions-based approach . . . is a recipe for staying in Afghanistan forever. He has reached the conclusion that the United States will complete its drawdown and will remove its forces from Afghanistan before September 11th.”

Biden administration officials say the United States intends to remain closely involved in the peace process and will continue to provide humanitarian aid and assistance to the Afghan government and security forces, which remain almost totally dependent on foreign support.

“What we will not do is use our troops as bargaining chips,” the senior official said.

While officials said Biden would end the military mission entirely, they acknowledged that an undetermined number of troops would remain to secure the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, where diplomats would be vulnerable if security deteriorates in the Afghan capital.

During his campaign, Biden said his preference was to leave a counterterrorism force of about 1,500 troops in Afghanistan even as other forces withdrew. That now appears to be off the table.

Based on Biden’s past speeches and approach towards Afghanistan, one can say that under his leadership, the US is not going to abandon Afghanistan all out. The Biden Administration will review the US–Taliban withdrawal deal. NATO in its meeting on Afghanistan has also postponed the decision on withdrawal.

Biden has consistently advocated for the lightest possible military footprint in Afghanistan, focused purely on counter-terrorism, and he has suggested, more than once in the last decade, that concern for the fate of the Afghan government or people should not determine U.S. policy in the region. Still, even the desire to maintain a small counter-terrorism footprint (Biden has suggested that the force be several thousand strong) will raise difficult issues. If this past view becomes future policy, the new administration will need to confront the question of how long such a footprint should be maintained, as well as whether and how that idea can be reconciled with a peace process made possible by Washington’s commitment to the exact opposite in the 29 February 2020 agreement with the Taliban.

Taliban’s Response

The Taliban has promised to renew attacks on U.S. and NATO personnel if foreign troops are not out by the deadline — and said in a statement it would not continue to participate in “any conference” about Afghanistan’s future until all “foreign forces” have departed. Although Turkey announced that the Afghan meeting would go ahead on April 24, Mohammad Naeem, spokesman for the Taliban political office, said in a tweet that “until all foreign forces completely withdraw from our homeland,” the group would “not participate in any conference that shall make decisions about Afghanistan.”

No U.N. meeting has been confirmed. Khalilzad’s shuttle diplomacy among the Afghans and with regional leaders has yet to bring the two sides together in agreement.

If the negotiations break down, the following scenarios may emerge. First, the US withdraws unilaterally, and Afghanistan sinks into chaos because the Taliban alone cannot control the whole of Afghanistan. Different regional states will support different groups based on ethnicity or political interests. The instability will have cross-border negative consequences for Pakistan. Pakistan can do little in this case as huge financial resources will be required to sustain any support for any political group in Afghanistan. This may lead to lack of confidence and suspicions among neighbors of Afghanistan also which will be detrimental for national and regional inclusive growth.

The second scenario can be that the US stays militarily with renewed Taliban opposition and the status quo remains for the unseeable future. In either case, instability will prevail. So, the Afghan endgame will be protracted; however, the peace process must be alive because the only way forward for sustainable peace in Afghanistan is through a negotiated political settlement.

Biden’s Afghan policy

US President Joe Biden has yet to come out with a comprehensive future policy regarding Afghanistan – how to handle the post-deal situation.

Based on Biden’s past speeches and approach towards Afghanistan, one can say that under his leadership, the US is not going to abandon Afghanistan all out. The Biden Administration will review the US–Taliban withdrawal deal. NATO in its meeting on Afghanistan has also postponed the decision on withdrawal. It is hard to predict a government’s policy and strategy, but it can be deducted from various readings that the Biden Administration may support the Doha peace deal but may postpone the troops’ withdrawal if the parties do not reach an agreement. A review of the deal/withdrawal will include consultations with the European Union and NATO allies and will have repercussions if the Taliban are not taken on board.

Therefore, it seems unlikely that his administration will entirely reverse the commitment to withdrawal of US forces unilaterally. It has been suggested by some US analysts that America and its allies must also pressurize the incumbent Kabul regime to reach a settlement. So, the Kabul regime and the Taliban will and must face some pressure to make compromises.

The difficulty with the US-Afghan government stance is the reduction in war from the Taliban, no progress on new political setup, removing sanctions from the Taliban and release of remaining Taliban prisoners linked with the start of intra-Afghan negotiations as per the deal. The Taliban have been joined by 5000 released prisoners and the emboldened Taliban may topple the Afghan government. Reconciling Afghans factions is further complicated by internal and external dynamics.

Any unilateral decision regarding the agreement without the consent of the Taliban may further weaken the US/NATO’s already weakened position in Afghanistan. The complexity comes in if troops withdraw without reaching any consensus on political settlement and Afghanistan moves towards a civil war like situation. The Afghanistan Study Group has also painted a bleak picture of Afghanistan if the remaining US troops withdraw without a negotiated political settlement.