The emergence of open and amicable ties between Israel and certain Gulf Arab nations stands out as a noteworthy development in the 21st-century Middle East. Amid widespread regional turmoil, civil unrest, and the realignment of geopolitical forces, this shift in dynamics holds significant strategic importance, especially for the Gulf nations. While the longstanding reluctance to form formal relations with Israel was largely driven by the complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the reduced influence of the Palestinian national movement in regional politics now allows Gulf States greater flexibility to prioritize their national interests over broader “Arab” considerations.

The once-dominant concept of Pan-Arabism in the Middle East is under wane, a transformation which took place since the signing of the Camp David Accords, Abraham accords and Oslo accords leading to a pronounced fragmentation within the Arab world. Despite the absence of a conclusive peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians, the red line prohibiting a liaison with Israel among the Arab states was compromised.

Pan-Arabism initially took root in the Soviet communist bloc of Arab countries, creating a divide between Islamists and Pan-Arabs. This rift weakened Soviet influence, ultimately benefiting the Western bloc. Furthermore, the intricate involvement of Iran in Middle East politics poses a significant security challenge for Saudi Arabia, driven by its aspirations for regional hegemony. This rivalry unfolds as a complex interplay of political and economic dynamics, accentuated by religious disparities. Both nations exploit regional sectarianism to advance geopolitical objectives within a broader conflict context.

The Saudi-UAE axis, comprising like-minded states with coordinated foreign policy objectives, aligns strategically with Morocco and Bahrain in forging ties with Israel. This alignment seeks to mitigate regional threats and counter Iranian influence in the region by securing Western security backing and leveraging technological assistance from Western allies of Israel. Riyadh and Tel Aviv have clandestinely collaborated for years, predominantly on security matters and intelligence exchange. Nevertheless, indications from the political leadership, particularly under the kingship of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, suggest a discernible shift toward an open approach towards Israel, one that does not preclude the normalization of ties in advance of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. Following recent events, the initial blow is dealt to the process of normalizing relations with Israel, facilitated by U.S. mediation. Both Iran and Hamas spokespersons openly express that one of the objectives behind the attacks on Israel was to disrupt this diplomatic development. The “resistance” axis, led by Iran, perceives normalization as a strategic manoeuvre favouring the U.S., Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Abraham Accords countries, aiming to shift the regional balance of power.

Normalization held significant security implications for Saudi Arabia, involving a potential defense pact with the U.S. On the diplomatic front, it sought to bolster an alliance of moderate Middle Eastern states against Iran and its proxies. Economically, the agreement aimed to support Saudi Arabia’s development initiatives, including projects like the futuristic Neom city. Saudi Arabia aims to attract foreign investment and foster the growth of the kingdom’s tourism sector, aligning with the objectives of Saudi Vision 2030, which seeks to diversify the economy. In light of America’s staunch commitment to Israel’s security, Gulf States anticipate that forging ties with Israel will bolster their own economic and security relations with the United States, given the decades-old American-backed security architecture in the region. As a reciprocal response to security considerations, the United States continues to import oil from the Gulf. Egypt has long served as an illustrative case for Gulf States, showcasing the substantial diplomatic benefits that a formal alliance with Israel can yield in Washington. Following the 1978-79 peace treaty with Israel, according to which Israel was supposed to buy Egyptian oil and gas. This way Egypt strategically aligned itself with the U.S. and emerged as the second-largest recipient of American economic aid and military assistance, despite concerns about its authoritarian politics and human rights record.

Amidst Middle East states forging relations with Israel, the UAE’s motives appear to encapsulate the evolving regional landscape. Departing from the historically normative Arab perspective on Israel, the Jordan and UAE perceives Israel neither as a regional adversary nor a destabilizing force. Concurrently, responding to the challenge posed by regional uprisings, middle-east nations actively acquire advanced surveillance technology, an arena where Israel willingly participates with limited concerns over potential human rights issues. This collaboration not only enhances bilateral ties but also creates novel avenues for commercial engagement, aligning with the UAE’s aspirations to position itself as a regional technology and innovation hub. Additionally, following normalization, the involved parties have unveiled various realms of commercial cooperation, including initiatives such as an oil pipeline spanning from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.

Despite Qatar’s recent reconciliation with the Saudi-UAE axis in 2021, formalizing relations with Israel seems unlikely in the short term due to broader regional rivalry. Qatar’s current stance aligns with supporting Palestinians, offering an implicit opposition to embracing Israel. However, if the potential benefits of normalization become compelling, Qatar may reconsider its position, following the precedent set by the UAE and Bahrain. In contrast, Kuwait and Oman maintains a distinct position within the Middle East, publicly rejecting ties with Israel as long as Palestinians are under occupation, reflecting a commitment rooted in historical, political, and representative considerations.

In the internal discourse of Middle East states, numerous articles have surfaced, vehemently condemning Hamas’s actions as inconsistent with Islam and detrimental to the Palestinian image. Critics argue that the October 7 attack lacked effectiveness in achieving Palestinian goals, such as ending occupation and establishing two states within the 1967 borders. While diverse voices exist in the Middle East’s media and on social platforms, it appears that these viewpoints do not reflect the higher echelons of authority. Despite not publicly acknowledging it, there’s a discernible inclination within the Middle East states to diminish, if not eliminate, Hamas. The perceived humiliation by a relatively small organization has left an enduring impact, leading Saudi Arabia to suspend normalization with Israel. Although the kingdom initially sought normalization post-war, there’s a determined resolve within Saudi leadership to proceed with their plans, potentially turning a significant setback into a substantial diplomatic achievement and countering Iran and its proxies, particularly Hamas.

In conclusion, the contemporary geopolitical landscape is characterized more by geo-economic considerations than by the previously prevalent ideology of Arab nationalism. The ties between various Middle East states and Israel are neither novel nor consistent, yet shifts in regional dynamics have compelled certain states to reassess their relationship with their former adversary. Driven by regional challenges and the imperative to ensure U.S. involvement in their security, the Saudi-UAE axis, along with other like-minded Arab states has departed from the longstanding Arab policy prioritizing Palestine, opting instead for an alliance with Israel. Recently a proposal to cut all diplomatic and economic ties with Tel Aviv, close Arab airspace to Israeli flights, and use oil as leverage for a Gaza ceasefire was rejected by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, Mauritania, and Djibouti.While these states currently view normalization as advantageous, it is not devoid of potential risks and costs that might become more evident in the future.