Pakistan Negotiations with TTP and TLP

Negotiations with insurgents such as TTP have been a common practice in Pakistan for almost the past two decades. The outcomes of these negotiations have garnered mixed views on whether or not it is a desired course of action. With the failure of every single peace deal since 2004, we reach a point where it

Negotiations with insurgents such as TTP have been a common practice in Pakistan for almost the past two decades. The outcomes of these negotiations have garnered mixed views on whether or not it is a desired course of action. With the failure of every single peace deal since 2004, we reach a point where it is debatable how much importance do these ‘peace deals’ hold. Similarly, in light of recent events with the rise to power of TLP and government negotiations with the previously banned outfit, one has to remain skeptical of whether these agreements hold any significance for the citizens of Pakistan.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, also commonly known as TTP, an umbrella term used for many militant groups that operate within Pakistan. Despite being officially formed in 2007, Pakistan’s fight against these armed militants has been going on since 2004. TTP, with its main aim to combat Pakistan’s security forces and to establish a sharia law system in Pakistan, has been extremely aggressive. Unfortunately, Pakistan and its people have been on the receiving end of this aggression.

To counter these armed militias, initially, the State’s approach was to conduct negotiations with the groups, signing peace deals and agreements which were all later violated. The first-ever was the Shakai agreement in April 2004, between the Pakistani authorities and Nek Muhammad Wazir. The agreement was signed after a military operation and was soon followed by another military operation in June 2004, once the terms of the agreement were not upheld by Nek Muhammad. Followed by the Sararogha agreements with Baitullah Mehsud in February 2005, which was again unsuccessful as clashes between the military and the militants continued.

The next peace deal that was signed by Pakistan was with North Waziristan commander Hafiz Gul Bahadar in September 2006, it marked the end of the Waziristan conflict between the Pakistani military and the rebels. This deal also broke down in May 2007. Pakistan did not give up not trying to make peace with the militants and again in 2009 saw the Swat Peace Agreement. The provincial government agreed upon having a sharia-based system known as ‘Nizam-e-adl’, essentially handing over the entire region to the armed rebels, for the sake of peace in other parts of the country. Yet they still failed to appease the TTP and were again in efforts of forming another pact with the said group.

Although military operations are common, officially these peace deals are relatively more popular amongst the political elite. One could argue that exerting power without any negotiations between the groups and the state would lead us to no good, however, the results are what we see today as most of these efforts at reconciling with the TTP left Pakistan in a worse position than before. Moreover, the conditions set by the Taliban as well as the Pakistani authorities were often completely disregarded, essentially challenging the basis on which negotiations were conducted. However, all hope is not lost, as negotiations remain an important instrument in tackling the issue of insurgency. What needs to be considered is where did we go wrong.

Pakistan’s failure to have a successful peace deal is because there are many factors playing into the entire ordeal. Although an attempt to make peace with the insurgents does not automatically make the state weak, to do so without considering the fundamental principles of TTP’s ideology, shows naivety on Pakistan’s part. TTP and its main goal to overthrow the Pakistani government should not be overlooked once making such decisions. One has to take into account that the militants would not want to reconcile with a state that is against their ideology in the first place. Secondly, knowing that TTP is an amalgamation of different militant groups and rebels, negotiating with one main faction does not guarantee complete cooperation.

Previously Pakistan’s attempts at negotiation have been criticised for being less organized and lacking proper communication, when the government refused to initiate talks over confusion with the makeup of the rebel’s negotiating team. Whereas some are of the view that no matter what efforts are being made from Pakistan’s side, all peace talks and negotiations are only a way for the TTP to regroup and reorganize. After nearly two decades of continued fighting and attempts to talk with the rebels, now the TTP have somewhat lost their strong foothold in the region.

Now as Pakistan moves on, leaving behind the times of a neverending security crisis, it faces a similar yet different predicament with Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP). TLP, also being religiously motivated, operates on the basis of protecting the finality of Prophethood, and aggressively supporting the blasphemy laws of Pakistan. Unlike TTP, TLP has managed to gather masses in its support and continues to actively mobilise its supporters whenever the need arises. Over the past few years it has become an annual occurrence where they gather around the Capital territory, completely halting and disrupting all life around the twin cities.

The Pakistani government is said to have entered into agreements with the group previously as well as recently. Yet one remains skeptical about the credibility of these talks and negotiations, as we have witnessed and continue to do so that TLP still exercises its power and influence to mobilise supporters and disrupt life all across the country. Although TLP and TTP are two very different organisations, and operate on the basis of different principles, they both challenge Pakistan’s sovereignty in their own ways. Earlier during the year in April, France also suggested to its nationals and the companies operating in Pakistan to temporarily leave the country. Which is telling that if these annual frenzied protests are not stopped, they could sever Pakistan’s diplomatic ties with France and the EU.

Other than negotiations the only option left is to use brute force, which is a quick solution but not necessarily a wise one. Talks should be encouraged, as they allow two parties to reach a common ground with little to no loss of life. However, in Pakistan’s case one has to remain apprehensive, as the talks alone do not guarantee desired outcomes. Learning from previous experiences Pakistan should conduct these negotiations in a comprehensive and conclusive manner. Whilst taking into account where it is necessary, unnecessary negotiations could also lead to the State appearing as weak in front of the rebels.