India’s rhetoric about weaponizing the Indus Waters Treaty cannot hold ground in reality, as the practical consequences would ultimately prove disastrous for both its own people and its reputation, internationally. This treaty stood firm in the dark hours of three wars but became victim of Hindutva inspired leadership. Despite several bilateral crises, the treaty has endured until recently, when India unilaterally announced the suspension of the treaty with Pakistan. The decision came against the backdrop of Pahalgam incident in Kashmir which took lives of 26 Hindus in Indian illegally occupied Kashmir.  Though, this move is symbolic of the rising political animosity between both arch-rivals under Narendra Modi’s government, it is unlikely to have any substantial practical impact. The ground reality shaped by hydrological constraints and legal obligations, suggests that India cannot unilaterally abrogate or effectively suspend the treaty.

It is not physically feasible for India to hold the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance in literal terms. The practical realities on the ground undermine India’s strategy of using water as a weapon. The western rivers allocated to Pakistan i.e., the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab originate from three different regions, making it nearly impossible for India to hold or divert their flow. Together, these rivers bring approximately 250–260 billion cubic meters of water to Pakistan annually. Among them, the Indus is the largest, originating in Tibet (China), flowing through Ladakh, and then entering Pakistan via Kashmir. The Jhelum originates from Verinag in Indian-administered Kashmir, while the Chenab begins in Himachal Pradesh. Any attempt to retain or divert the flow of these rivers within Indian territory would result in severe upstream flooding.

India currently lacks the necessary infrastructure along the courses of these rivers to implement such a strategy effectively. India has the right under the treaty to use these rivers for non-consumptive purposes such as hydropower generation and limited irrigation, but constructing storage and diversion facilities at scale is restricted and remained a challenge. Many of the proposed Indian projects have faced delays due to technical, financial and environmental hurdles. Even today, India does not have sufficient dam storage on the western rivers to hold or divert water in any meaningful way that could hurt Pakistan.

The IWT allows India to build run-of-the-river projects, which do not significantly store water, on the western rivers. However, India’s ability to build such projects has been slow. Key projects such as Kishanganga, Baglihar and Ratle on the Jhelum and Chenab rivers have taken years, if not decades, to complete and have often become points of contention themselves. As of now, India’s water storage capacity on these rivers is estimated to be less than 5% of their total flow. This means that even if India wanted to cut off water from Pakistan, it lacks the infrastructure to do so effectively. Moreover, geography is not in India’s favor. The topography of Jammu and Kashmir, through which these rivers flow, is rugged and mountainous. The hurdle comes in creating large reservoirs that would not only be environmentally disruptive but also strategically vulnerable.

India’s suspension of the IWT must be viewed through a political lens. This is less about water management and more about sending a message to both Pakistan and to India’s domestic electorate. The move came amid heightened tensions over Pakistan’s criticism of India’s actions in Kashmir and its diplomatic offensive on the international stage. It is consistent with the Modi government’s narrative of muscular nationalism and zero tolerance toward Pakistan. However, beneath this show of Indian aggression towards Pakistan lies a weak factual base. The fact is that India lacks the physical and hydrological infrastructure to fully utilize the western rivers.

India’s suspension of the IWT also raises questions of legality and international standing. The treaty is a binding agreement brokered under the auspices of the World Bank and contains no provision for unilateral withdrawal or suspension. This makes India’s announcement a political posturing rather than a legal act. From an international law perspective, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which India is a signatory, prohibits unilateral withdrawal from bilateral treaties unless there is a fundamental breach of terms. If India insists on walking away from the treaty without mutual consent, it risks reputational damage and sets a dangerous precedent. Other countries watching this move may begin to question India’s reliability as a party to international agreements. It would also hurt India’s reputation internationally and its ambition of becoming a rising o major power in future.

Water must not become the next battleground in the India-Pakistan rivalry. The Indus Waters Treaty is not perfect, but it has worked. It has helped avert water wars in a region plagued by territorial disputes, mistrust and violence. Its strength lies in its technical clarity and institutional mechanisms, not in the goodwill of politicians. India’s recent declaration of suspending the treaty is an attempt to score political points at home, not a real shift in policy. The reality is that India neither has the legal authority nor the technical means to dismantle the treaty unilaterally. If India wants to press for a revision or modernization of the treaty to reflect current and future challenges, it should do so through mutual negotiation and international cooperation not through unilateral declarations. On the other hand, if Pakistan wishes to ensure that its water rights are protected, it must continue to engage constructively through legal channels and diplomatic pressure. The IWT should not be held hostage to the ebb and flow of political tension. It must be treated as a lifeline for both states, literally and diplomatically.